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http://www.jstor.orgInefficient  Foreign Borrowing: 
A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective 
By  JEAN TIROLE* 
Studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing, the paper first looks at 
whether  and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate. It then revisits the 
"original sin" debate, analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment, 
international  portfolio diversification,  domestic currency  denomination  and longer 
maturities  enhance borrowing  countries' access to international  lending. The  paper 
thereby relates a  country's level and quality of access  to international capital 
markets  to a variety of institutional  features such as the level of domestic savings, 
their location, the extent of control rights held by political authorities, and the 
interests of dominant  domestic  political forces. (JEL D82, F33, F34) 
The paper  addresses  a few familiar  questions 
related to capital account liberalization:  What 
makes a country  attractive  to foreign investors? 
Do countries borrow enough? Should one add 
some  "sand in the wheels"  of international cap- 
ital markets,  or, rather,  should international  di- 
versification  be further  encouraged?  And should 
incentives be provided to the private sector to 
avoid "dangerous  forms of finance"? 
Regarding level  issues, the evidence over- 
whelmingly points in the direction  of underbor- 
rowing. Almost all countries have small gross 
asset positions,1  invest most of their  equity  port- 
folio at home,2 and exhibit a high sensitivity of 
* Institut  D'Economie Industrielle,  MF529, 21 Allee de 
Brienne,  31000  Toulouse,  France;  IDEI,  GREMAQ, 
CERAS, and MIT (e-mail: tirole@cict.fr).  This paper was 
the support for the FranK  Graham Memorial Lecture at 
Princeton  University (April 11, 2002), a keynote lecture at 
the annual LACEA meeting (Madrid, October 11, 2002), 
and one of two Marshall lectures (Cambridge  University, 
February  5-6,  2003). I am grateful to the participants,  as 
well as to Bruno Biais, Ricardo Caballero, Pierre-Olivier 
Gourinchas,  Olivier Jeanne,  Hyun Shin, Aaron  Tornell,  two 
anonymous referees, and participants  at seminars at Har- 
vard,  Lausanne,  Paris,  Toulouse and the International  Mon- 
etary  Fund,  and  at  a  joint  Wharton-CFS conference 
(Eltville, June 12-14, 2003) for helpful comments and dis- 
cussions, and to the Fondation  Banque de France  for finan- 
cial support. 
1 Aart Kraay  et al. (2000). 
2 Kenneth  R. French  and James M. Poterba  (1991) esti- 
mate that over 90 percent of U.S. and Japanese financial 
portfolios  are invested  in domestic  assets (the corresponding 
consumption  to domestic production.3  Thus, the 
potential benefits from capital account liberal- 
ization seem to  have gone largely unreaped. 
Poor countries seem to borrow only  a  small 
fraction  of what  their  development  needs or cost 
advantages would vindicate, while rich coun- 
tries hardly diversify their portfolios interna- 
tionally. Standard attempts at explaining the 
home biases have proved unsatisfactory.4 
On structure  issues, a majoritarian  view has 
emerged  in the wake of the recent  twin currency 
and banking crises.  Commentaries have  ex- 
pressed much concern about a trilogy of dan- 
gerous  forms  of  financial  structures: debt 
finance,5  short maturities,  and foreign currency 
denomination of  liabilities.  In  particular, a 
widespread  consensus  has developed in favor of 
percentages are 89 percent for France and 85 percent for 
Germany).  3 See  Karen Lewis  (1999).  A  related fact is  that the 
cross-country  correlation  of consumptions  is typically less 
than 0.5, and smaller than that of outputs. 
4 See Lewis (1999) for a review. These standard  attempts 
consist in introducing  (a) purchasing  power parity failures, 
(b) nontraded  wealth, (c)  indirect diversification through 
domestic stocks of multinationals,  and (d) costs associated 
to foreign portfolio investment. 
5 The debt finance bias is not specific to emerging mar- 
kets. Kraay  et al.'s (2000) estimates for industrial  countries 
are that foreign equity assets and liabilities account for 
about 3.3 percent and 3.9 percent of wealth, respectively. 
The corresponding  percentage  on the loan side is approxi- 
mately 11 percent. 
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encouraging  equity portfolio and foreign direct 
investment and discouraging  short-term  capital 
inflows and of promoting better risk manage- 
ment so as to prevent  large corporate  exposures 
to a depreciation  of the currency. 
Beneath the debates on borrowing  level and 
structure  lies an implicit assumption  of a capi- 
tal market failure. Somehow, capital account 
liberalization  per se does not induce financial 
markets  to generate  the right economic signals. 
There is  no  arguing that short-term, dollar- 
denominated  debt  constitutes  a poor  hedge against 
liquidity and currency  risks. (For an empirical 
analysis and a questioning  of the causal link, see 
Enrica Detragiache and Antonio Spilimbergo, 
2001.) But, presumably,  borrowers  design their 
financial  structures  to their  own benefit, and one 
cannot  presuppose  that  dangerous  forms of debt 
constitute suboptimal  liability structures. 
This paper  identifies  and focuses on a specific 
market failure, stemming from  a  dual-  and 
common-agency  problem.  In contract  economics, 
dual  agency,  also called "moral  hazard  in teams," 
refers to a situation  in which the welfare of  a 
principal  is affected by the combined  actions of 
two agents. Common agency in contrast  arises 
when a single agent's  action  affects  the welfare  of 
multiple  principals.  The paper's  take is that,  in a 
private  lending arrangement,  the investor's  pros- 
pect of recouping  his investment  depends  on the 
behavior  of the  borrower,  with  whom  he contracts, 
and  of the borrower's  government,  with whom he 
does not. That  is, investor  returns  depend  on gov- 
ernment  policy as well as the firm's managerial 
choices. This dual-agency  problem  translates  into 
a common-agency one in which pairwise op- 
timal  contracts  exert  externalities  on  each 
other through their impact on country incen- 
tives: The government is a common agent of 
all  firms  (borrower-investor pairs),  and  its 
policy choice depends on a representative fi- 
nancial contract, but not, with a large number 
of private sector players, on the financial con- 
tract of any single firm.6 
The model has three dates. Date 0  is  the 
financing stage, in which borrowing  levels and 
structures  are specified  by pairwise  optimal  con- 
6 More generally, this common-agency  externality  exists 
as long as there are at least two private sector borrowers. 
tracts  between foreign and domestic lenders  and 
private sector companies. Domestic capital is 
limited, and thus the benefit from capital ac- 
count liberalization  is the firms' access to for- 
eign  capital (I  will  occasionally invoke risk 
diversification  as well). Profits accrue and are 
distributed according to  contractual commit- 
ments at date 2. 
The date-2 outcomes depend on a policy se- 
lected by the government  at date 1. Following 
the international  economics literature,7  the gov- 
ernment  favors domestic interests over foreign 
ones. And, when arbitrating  among domestic 
interests, it may either put equal weights on 
domestic constituencies' surpluses  or engage in 
redistributive  politics. 
The government impacts the foreign inves- 
tors' return through the exercise of  its many 
control rights. A first set of control rights held 
by the government affects both domestic and 
foreign investors' returns as in the case of  a 
change in corporate  governance  and  bankruptcy 
laws or in the resources affected to their en- 
forcement,  or a change in tax and  labor  laws.8  A 
second set of control  rights affects the tradable- 
nontradable mix  and international collateral. 
Foreigners are ultimately reimbursed  in trad- 
ables. Any government  policy that reduces the 
amount  of tradable  goods that  can be returned  to 
foreigners can exert a negative externality on 
foreign  investors.  Examples  of  government 
moral hazard with respect to the mix includes 
encouraging  excessive investments in the non- 
tradable  sector, most commonly in real estate, 
failing to sink export promoting investments, 
for example investments  in public infrastructure 
for  tourism, depleting international reserves, 
failing to diversify exports, thus making repay- 
ment to foreigners  riskier,  and, when foreigners 
hold  domestic  currency denominated assets, 
failing to take steps that would reduce the risk 
7 See  for example the terms-of-trade  literature  (Harry 
Johnson, 1954; Avinash Dixit,  1987; Kyle Bagwell  and 
Robert Staiger, 2000). 
8 Another example is  poor infrastructure  management 
due to nepotism, clientelism or corruption.  A more indirect 
impact  operates through increases  in  public  liabilities 
through  regulatory  forbearance  and fiscal deficits, that  affect 
the  likely  exercise  of  government control rights in  the 
future. 
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of depreciation  of the currency. All these be- 
haviors reduce the return  to foreign investors.9 
The model embodies two possible sources of 
time inconsistency. First, as in the sovereign 
debt literature,  domestic interests prevail over 
foreign ones  which,  if  anticipated, result in 
scant or more expensive foreign borrowing.10 
Second, when domestic firms are subject to 
agency costs, the date-l policy choice no longer 
internalizes the  possibility  that an  investor- 
friendly  course of action alleviates  credit  ration- 
ing and attracts  capital. 
Attempts  to alleviate the cost of time incon- 
sistency belong to two distinct categories. The 
first refers to  the abandonment  of  sovereign 
rights and has received much attention in the 
literatures on  trade (e.g.,  joining  the  World 
Trade Organization  [WTO]) and central bank- 
ing (e.g., making  the central  bank  independent). 
The second addresses  common agency and the 
resulting lack of  coordination in foreign bor- 
9 To these must be added,  of course, less subtle ways of 
reducing  foreigners' returns,  as when the Argentinian  gov- 
ernment  pleases local firms  through  "peso-ification"  of dol- 
lar debts. 
Commentaries  often downplay the role of moral hazard 
in  recent crises, on  the grounds that following  a  crisis 
incumbent politicians may lose office and that IMF pro- 
grams further  erode their power. There are two issues with 
this argument.  First,  excluding government  moral  hazard  on 
the ground  that no finance minister would voluntarily  pro- 
voke a crisis is like saying that  fire insurance  does not create 
moral  hazard  because homeowners  do not usually set fire to 
their house once insured. The problem with governments 
and homeowners  is not that  they will set fire to their homes 
but rather that they will  be less  cautious at the margin. 
Governments  will not take the actions that  reduce the prob- 
ability of a crisis ten years from now from 5 percent  to, say, 
1 percent, if they entail an immediate  political cost. 
Second, "government  moral hazard"  is usually given a 
narrow  definition  and  related  to the investors'  expectation  of 
a banking bailout. Actions that directly impact the value 
of  foreign investors' assets are less  likely to generate a 
backlash. 
10  To be certain, the U.S. government  also impacts the 
return  of investors in GM, Intel or a Silicon Valley startup. 
However, dual agency is much more relevant in a finan- 
cially  integrated economy than in  a  financially isolated 
economy, for two reasons:  First, the government  has much 
less incentive to defend the investors' interests  when these 
investors do not vote or more generally have limited polit- 
ical leverage. Second, the government  has many more de- 
grees of freedom in the open economy context as it can 
impact the tradable-nontradable  mix. 
rowing by altering private sector incentives. I 
focus on this latter and newer aspect." 
The paper  first looks at aggregate  borrowing. 
Section I studies whether  and when partial  cap- 
ital account liberalization  benefits countries in 
the  presence or  absence of  credit rationing. 
While no strong case can be built on a priori 
grounds that countries over- or underborrow, 
the section identifies some factors that call for 
or against capital controls. 
The paper then shifts attention to structure 
issues and analyzes whether and when equity 
portfolio investments  and home biases (Section 
II), longer maturities  (Section III) and domestic 
currency denomination (Section IV)  enhance 
borrowing countries' access  to  international 
lending. Section V summarizes  and concludes. 
A general  theme of the analysis of borrowing 
structure  is that dangerous  forms of finance are 
also "policy resistant;"  they make the govern- 
ment more accountable,  ultimately  to the benefit 
of the country. Encouraging  foreign direct and 
equity portfolio investment and promoting in- 
ternational  diversification  do not encourage ac- 
countability.  Some match  between stakeholders 
and political constituencies must be achieved. 
Debt financing and small frictions inducing a 
home bias, therefore,  should  not be the object of 
widespread opprobrium,  even though, as Sec- 
tion II shows, they will be encouraged  by pol- 
iticians eager to favor their corporate friends 
and then may have perverse consequences. 
Closely related insights apply to what Barry 
Eichengreen  and Ricardo  Hausmann  (1999) call 
the original sin, referring  to emerging markets' 
widespread  practice of borrowing short and in 
foreign  currency.  Section II  develops a general- 
equilibrium model of  independent interest, in 
which domestic firms  optimally  design the term 
structure  of  their liabilities in anticipation of 
future  government  policies and the government 
responds to these privately optimal, but unco- 
ordinated  financial structures  when selecting a 
domestic-welfare  maximizing policy. It shows 
that forcing private borrowers  to tilt the matu- 
rity structure  toward  the long term reduces wel- 
fare. Section IV studies the choice of currency 
1 The control rights implications are discussed from a 
corporate  finance perspective  in Tirole (2002). 
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denomination  and again shows that risk expo- 
sure is the flip side of policy resistance. 
By focusing on a specific market  failure  (lack 
of coordination  of private  sector  borrowing),  the 
paper delivers strong results and sharp (though 
potentially controversial) policy prescriptions. 
While I view the particular  market failure as 
important  and the public policy effects as first 
order, I also acknowledge that a broader  view 
embodying other  well-grounded  market  failures 
is warranted.  In this respect,  the paper's  analysis 
can be read  from a different  perspective,  namely 
that of a complementarity  between "corporate 
finance reform" and "government  governance 
reform."12  Public policies that counter danger- 
ous forms of finance, such as taxes on short- 
term  capital  inflows  or  foreign  currency 
borrowing13  or the subsidization  of foreign di- 
rect investment, have more appeal when the 
country's  constitutional design,  institutional 
features  (such as the creation  of pension funds), 
domestic politics, and residents' pattern  of in- 
vestment (home versus abroad) concur to put 
investor protection  reasonably  high on the rul- 
ers' priority list. Conversely, banning danger- 
ous forms of finance is likely to be more costly 
when the government's  commitment  toward  in- 
vestors  is  weak.  With  this  perspective, the 
reader can take along the highlighted effects 
without  necessarily  embracing  all  policy 
implications. 
Related Literature.-This  paper builds on a 
number  of disjoint literatures.  Technically, it is 
most related  to the literature  on common agency 
with moral hazard, pioneered by Mark Pauly 
(1974) and B. Douglas Bemheim and Michael 
Whinston (1986).  For example, Pauly's cele- 
brated insight is  that nonexclusive insurance 
contracts give rise to externalities between in- 
surers,  who do not internalize  the impact of the 
reduction in  the insuree's care on  the  other 
insurers;  this inefficiency is ultimately  borne  by 
the insuree who ends up overinsured. 
Several research lines have emphasized the 
cost  of  the  governments' time  inconsistency 
12I  am  grateful  to  a  referee  for  suggesting  this 
interpretation. 
13 Assuming these taxes are effective in reaching their 
goal. 
problem in an international  context. The litera- 
ture on  sovereign debt  (Jeremy Bulow  and 
Kenneth Rogoff, 1989a, b; Jonathan  Eaton and 
Raquel Femrnandez,  1995), like this paper, em- 
phasizes domestic preferences  of governments. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) show how creditor 
country governments  may be gamed into con- 
tributing  to rescheduling agreements.  Kraay et 
al. (2000) argue that countries minimize their 
exposure  to sovereign risk by keeping small net 
asset positions, and even small gross asset po- 
sitions if transfers  of ownership involve large 
transaction  costs. Jeffrey Sachs (e.g., 1989) and 
others  have argued  that  countries  with high lev- 
els of sovereign debt are subject to debt over- 
hang and invest too little because part of the 
benefits from this investment  accrue  to foreign- 
ers (which implies that the sovereign and for- 
eign lenders  can reach  a Pareto  improvement  by 
renegotiation);  Application 1 in Section II, sub- 
section B, makes a similar point in the context 
of private sector borrowing  and general public 
policies (although  renegotiation  is less credible 
in our context since individual  borrower-lender 
pairs have no private incentive to renegotiate). 
In contrast with the sovereign debt literature, 
this paper  emphasizes  uncoordinated  borrowing 
and its policy implications;  it also takes a much 
broader  view of "repudiation"  as it applies to 
the exercise of all control rights held by gov- 
ernments; last, it  focuses  on  rather different 
issues, such as original sin. 
The international  trade literature  on time in- 
consistency and excessive  protection (Staiger 
and  Guido  Tabellini,  1987;  Kiminori  Matsuyama, 
1990; Aaron Tomell,  1991)  is  also  relevant 
here; it  for example shows that the socially 
optimal policy-free  trade, say-is  often time 
inconsistent and that the time-consistent  policy 
frequently  leads to (ex ante) excessive protec- 
tion. Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez- 
Clare (1998) add capture-by-interest  groups as 
in  Gene  Grossman and  Elhanan Helpman 
(1994); politicians may want to commit to free 
trade (join the WTO) in order to avoid an ex 
ante misallocation  of investment  in favor of the 
sector that will receive protection  ex post, even 
though this implies forgoing future contribu- 
tions by interest groups. 
My analysis also complements Tomell and 
Andres Velasco's (1992) and Velasco's (1996) 
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modeling of capital flights, in which domestic 
residents decide how much to invest at home 
and abroad  in the presence of domestic redis- 
tributive  policies or increasing fiscal returns.14 
These contributions  focus on capital flows from 
poor to rich countries;  I focus on moral hazard 
by a borrowing  rather  than  lending  country.  The 
implications accordingly differ. For example, 
the domestic residents' ability to invest abroad 
acts as a disciplining  device in Tornell-Velasco, 
while a home bias tends to be beneficial in my 
analysis. Furthermore,  a major concern of this 
paper is the impact of borrowing structure  on 
government  moral  hazard,  which requires  mod- 
eling  capital inflows  and composition. Wolf 
Wagner (2001)  shows how  a home bias can 
reduce government  moral hazard  in a world in 
which investors want to diversify internation- 
ally, and governments tax their residents (for 
their own  sake) in order to  discourage them 
from competing to supply (investment) inputs 
that partly benefit foreign investors. 
There are few corporate  finance approaches 
to international  finance. Mark Gertler  and Ro- 
goff (1990) is a notable exception. This paper 
however is primarily interested in the size of 
capital flows,  and has no  government moral 
hazard, and a fortiori no dual- and common- 
agency problem. Government  moral hazard in 
contrast plays  an  important role  in  Olivier 
Jeanne's work (1999, 2000a, b, 2002). Jeanne 
shows that a lack of domestic monetary  credi- 
bility may induce private borrowers  to borrow 
in  foreign currency. While  foreign currency 
debt is dangerous  in the event of bad shock, it 
reflects optimal risk management  by firms con- 
ditional  on the lack of domestic monetary  cred- 
ibility. This may arise  because of the interaction 
between government's moral hazard and com- 
mitment  and signaling problems at the level of 
14  An earlier  contribution  to capital  flights and  increasing 
fiscal returns  is Eaton (1987). In that  paper,  foreign lenders 
require  a government  guarantee  on their loans (as the latter 
is  the  only  entity able to  enforce their contracts, say). 
Domestic residents  have an incentive to invest their money 
abroad and thereby escape taxation if other residents also 
do, since then foreign lending and concomitant  government 
guarantees increase. The process may result in multiple 
equilibria. 
entrepreneurs  (Jeanne, 1999, 2000a) or bank- 
ruptcy costs (Jeanne,  2002). 
Last, a number of themes developed in this 
paper are to some extent part of the "folk wis- 
dom" in the international  economics commu- 
nity, rather  than related to a specific literature. 
Relative to this, the paper's  contribution  is two- 
fold. First,  the corporate  finance  techniques  and 
the dual- and common-agency formulation  al- 
low me to build a formal framework  to validate 
the insights and identify their limits. Second, a 
formal model takes the folk  wisdom in  new 
directions,  most notably by incorporating  polit- 
ical economy considerations. 
I. Inefficient  Borrowing  Level 
A.  Bare-Bones Framework 
The bare-bones  framework  abstracts  from the 
issues of domestic incidence and redistributive 
politics by focusing on entrepreneurs  and for- 
eign investors (so, it ignores domestic savings, 
and assumes that the incidence of government 
policy  is  entirely  on  firms  and  foreign 
investors). 
A small country  is populated  by a large num- 
ber (technically, a  continuum of  mass  1) of 
identical,  risk  neutral "entrepreneurs,"  who 
more generally stand for domestic firms or in- 
siders. There is  a single (tradable) good and 
three dates, t =  0, 1, 2. 
Date 0: At the initial date, the representative 
entrepreneur  borrows  If from foreign investors. 
In exchange of If, the representative  entrepre- 
neur  issues financial  claims (debt,  equity) on the 
date-2 proceeds of her firm. 
The capital market  is competitive. Investors 
are  risk neutral  and  the world's rate  of interest  is 
normalized  to zero. That is, domestic entrepre- 
neurs can borrow  as much as they want as long 
as their lenders break  even on average. 
Date  1: At date 1, the country's government 
chooses an action or policy a E  .A C  R. The 
policy is chosen so as to maximize the entre- 
preneurs'  (ex post) welfare. 
Date 2: The proceeds from investment accrue 
at the final date, date 2.  The expected total 
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surplus or value created by the investment is 
denoted V(If, a)  and embodies both the costs 
and benefits for entrepreneurs  and foreign in- 
vestors of the government's  policy. Let Vf(If,  a) 
[smaller than V(If, a)]  denote the foreigners' 
expected date-2 income  from their financial 
claims. 
Letting If and a* denote the equilibrium  in- 
vestment and policy  choice,  the  competitive 
capital market assumption  implies that foreign 
investors  just break even: 
(1) 
equivalently,  the firms' net present  value (NPV) 
is captured  by the domestic entrepreneurs,  who 
receive utility 
(2)  U*  = U(If,  a*) =  V(I4, a*)  - I*. 
B.  Country  Borrowing in the Absence of 
Agency Cost 
Let us  first assume that borrowing is  not 
subject to any agency cost and so there is no 
credit rationing. The first-best investment IFB 
and policy aFB  respectively equalize the mar- 
ginal benefit and marginal  cost of investment:16 
(3) 
aV 
ai  (ifB, aF)  =  1, 
and maximize value: 
aV 
(4)  aa 
f  0 
(a  (IfiB' aFB)  =  O. 
When selecting her investment level at date 
0, the representative  entrepreneur  rationally  an- 
ticipates and takes the government policy  as 
given and thus solves 
In the following, I will assume that objective 
functions  have the required  concavity  properties 
and that choices  are governed by  first-order 
conditions. I  will  interpret the policy  in  the 
following way: 
ASSUMPTION  1: Policy  a  is  an  investor- 
friendly policy: In the relevant range 
aVf>. 
a 
For example, a higher policy choice may corre- 
spond to an improvement  in the corporate  gov- 
ernance legal  framework or  enforcement, to 
lower  taxes  on  capital, to  a  more investor- 
friendly labor environment,  or to a public in- 
vestment  in  complementary  infrastructure 
financed  through  taxes on domestic residents.15 
15  "In the relevant range"  refers to the fact that at some 
point, even Vf may end up decreasing as a increases. For 
example, an excessively harsh corporate  governance envi- 
ronment  may prevent  managers  from acting or may involve 
public expenditures that can only be  financed by taxing 
foreign investors. 
max{V(If,  a*) -  If 
If 
yielding an equilibrium  value I/equalizing mar- 
ginal benefit and marginal  cost of investment: 
(5) 
dV 
I (I*, a*)  =  1. 
At  date  1,  the government acts when the 
foreigners'  investment  I*fhas  already  been com- 
mitted; and so the government maximizes the 
entrepreneurs'  ex post payoff, which is  equal 
to  the  total pie  minus  what is  returned to 
foreigners: 
max{V(I, a) -  Vf(Iyf,  a)}, 
a 
yielding 
16  To  implement the first-best policy, the government 
need choose only a at date 0. As equation  (5) below shows, 
the investment  policy can then be left to the firms' discre- 
tion. The same remark holds for the second-best policy 
analyzed  in Section I, subsection  C. In contrast,  I show that 
the government wants to control If when it is  unable to 
commit to a. 
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aV  dVf 
(6)  a (I  a  (I,  a*). 
Unsurprisingly,  the government  underinvests- 
from an ex ante perspective-in  the investor- 
friendly  action (  V/la > 0). An equilibrium  is a 
pair (If*,  a*) satisfying (5) and (6). 
As discussed in the introduction,  the analysis 
from there on can either analyze external con- 
straints17  that alleviate the time inconsistency 
problem,  as is done in the literature,  or address 
the common-agency  problem so as to alter the 
government's incentives. I focus on the latter. 
So, I ask, does the country  borrow  too much or 
too little from abroad? Suppose that, starting 
from laissez-faire, foreign borrowing can be 
encouraged (e.g.,  through subsidies)  or  re- 
strained  (e.g., through  a capital control). Using 
the Envelope theorem, a small increase or de- 
crease in the representative  firm's investment 
has the following impact on the entrepreneur's 
welfare: 
d  dVda* 
(7)  df  (V(If,  a)  -  f)  =  a  dlf 
where a*(If) is given by condition (6): 
dV  dV 
aV (If,  a*(If))  =  a f (If,  a*()). 
The right-hand  side of  (7)  will  be called the 
commitment  effect. We then obtain the follow- 
ing simple result: 
PROPOSITION 1: In  the  absence  of  credit 
rationing, a capital control (a  reduction in If 
starting from  the  no-capital-control bench- 
mark) raises welfare if and only if 
da*  d  (VA\  d  Ia  V 
d-~s <0  : 
a-  I  > 
Ia 
While we would often expect less care to be 
exerted by the government as foreign invest- 
ment and therefore foreign ownership in the 
17  These  can be  seen  as  shrinking the goverment's 
choice set A 
country  increase  (da*/dlf < 0), it is equally  easy 
to find circumstances  under which, in the ab- 
sence of credit rationing,  a capital control low- 
ers welfare. For example, if the policy is subject 
to increasing returns  to scale,'  as may be the 
case for some types of supporting  infrastructure, 
a  more massive  capital inflow may  actually 
result in a more investor-friendly  outcome. Re- 
latedly, suppose that here are increasing fiscal 
returns to  scale as  in  Olivier Blanchard and 
Lawrence  Summers  (1987) and  Velasco (1996); 
that  is, the country  must rely on capital taxes to 
fund an incompressible level  of  government 
expenditures.  A capital control shrinks the tax 
base and raises per-unit  capital taxes, with po- 
tentially detrimental  effects (for example, a re- 
duction  in  domestic  savings,  if  these  are 
introduced into the picture). 9 Before putting 
more structure  on the model, let us look at the 
general impact of credit rationing. 
C.  Credit Rationing 
Borrowing is  usually subject to  substantial 
agency costs.  The  study of  the concomitant 
problem of credit rationing and of the various 
ways in which firms  attempt  to reduce  its impact 
has spawned a large variety of models. Fortu- 
nately, these  corporate finance models  have 
many common implications.  For the purpose  of 
this paper  the common feature  of interest  is that 
borrowing is  constrained  by the maximal ex- 
pected income that can be promised to inves- 
tors.  The  latter  is  called  the  "pledgeable 
income" and (for an anticipated  policy a*) will 
be denoted Vf(If,  a*). In corporate  finance  mod- 
els, aVf/lIf <  1 for the equilibrium  investment 
(for, if the pledgeable income increased faster 
than  investment,  investors  would benefit from a 
higher investment level and so there would be 
no credit rationing!). Section II, subsection A, 
provides an illustration  of the notion of pledge- 
able income. 
In corporate  finance, the unconstrained  bor- 
rowing condition (5)  is replaced by the twin 
18 In which case the first-order  approach  used here needs 
to be amended. 
191  am grateful  to Pierre-Olivier  Gourinchas  for provid- 
ing this example. 
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conditions  that  firms  borrow  as much as they are 
able to: 
(8)  If=  Vf(If,a*), 
and would like to borrow more if they could: 
(9) 
av 
ai  (If, a*)  >  1. 
af  ~ 
How is our conclusion about  country  borrow- 
ing  level  affected? Because  condition (6)  is 
unaffected (taking Vf =  Vf), 
d 
(10)  d  (V(If, a) -  If) 
aV  a V da* 
-  -1  +  a  If  -  a*  dIf' 
The second term  on the right-hand  side of equa- 
tion (10) is the same commitment  effect as in 
the absence of credit rationing.  The difference 
relates to the first term. The Envelope theorem 
no longer applies, and a capital control implies 
a direct  loss in net present  value since a  V/If >  1. 
It is also worth  pointing out that under  credit 
rationing the optimal commitment or second 
best  policy  no  longer  satisfies  aV/aa  =  0. 
Rather,  this policy (IB,  aSB) solves: 
max{V(If,  a) -  I} 
{If,a} 
s.t. 
(11)  If=  Vf(If, a), 
friendly policy helps attract  capital, which mo- 
tivates a distortion  relative to the first-best  rule 
(4). Once this capital is in place, though, the 
distortion  is no longer needed, and the govern- 
ment has a diminished incentive to be investor 
friendly. This second effect would exist even if 
investors were domestic residents.  Both effects 
point in the same direction:  The policy is not 
investor friendly enough, and the cost of this 
distortion is  ultimately borne by  the country 
itself.20 
PROPOSITION  2:  Under credit rationing, a 
positive commitment  benefit  from a capital con- 
trol, if it exists, may be offset by the direct NPV 
loss. 
Because credit rationing is pervasive in all 
economies, and especially in borrowing coun- 
tries, the analysis suggests that beneficial at- 
tempts at addressing  government  moral hazard 
are more likely to act on the structure  of bor- 
rowing than on its level.21  We therefore  turn  to 
a more structured  version of this general model 
to investigate such policies. 
II. Inefficient  Borrowing  Structure 
A.  Framework 
Let us now specialize the model and analyze 
externalities in  the  structure of  borrowing 
agreements. 
The representative  entrepreneur  is risk neu- 
tral, is protected  by limited liability, has initial 
wealth A, and invests I >  A. Domestic savings 
per entrepreneur  are fixed at level Id  >  0, and, 
like foreign investments, demand an expected 
or 
av  /av  dlf 
a-=-  y-1  a 
< ?0  a  a  \9If  /da 
where If(a) solves equation (11). 
The time-consistent policy a*  (which satis- 
fies aV/aa =  aVf/la >  0) thus is doubly biased 
relative to  the commitment policy  asB. First, 
and as in the absence of credit  rationing,  it does 
not internalize  the foreigners' welfare. Second, 
and a specificity of credit  rationing,  an investor- 
20  In this bare-bones model, foreigners would have an 
incentive to lobby in favor of investor-friendly  policies only 
at date 1. They would have an incentive to do so at date 0 
if they already  had some stake in the country at date 0. 
Note further  that even if international  investors have no 
stake at date 0, investor-friendly  measures in (or a better 
commitment by) a number of borrowing countries would 
raise the demand  for capital and the world interest  rate and 
ultimately  benefit these investors. 
21 Policy intervention  alternatively  may relax the credit 
constraint,  as in the case, considered in Section II, subsec- 
tion B, of an improvement  in corporate  governance. 
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rate of  return equal to  0.22  The entrepreneur 




At date 2,  a firm either succeeds and then 
yields RI, or fails, that  is yields nothing. Only a 
fraction of income is pledgeable: Investors re- 
ceive  rl  -  RI in case of  success, while the 
entrepreneur  appropriates  (R -  r)I. Neither  gets 
anything  in case of failure. 
The probability  of success is p +  r, where r 
is determined  by the government after the in- 
vestments are sunk. (So r is the action a of the 
previous section.) Enhancing  the probability  of 
success  of  domestic firms by  r  involves  an 
increasing and strictly convex lump-sum cost 
/y(T) per unit of investment. This cost is borne 
by domestic residents.23  The assumption that 
the cost y is proportional  to investment  is purely 
for analytical convenience. For example, the 
theory  would carry  through  if y included  a fixed 
component.  The cost 'y  may be incurred  by the 
firms' insiders-as  in the case of a strengthen- 
ing in corporate governance or more flexible 
labor  laws-or  by  the  population  as  a 
whole-as  in the case of investments in infra- 
structure  financed  by taxation  or a reduction  in 
public expenditures. I  will  discuss incidence 
shortly. 
For equilibrium  value r*, the pledgeable in- 
come is 
V-  (p +  r*)rI, 
and the entrepreneur's  date-2 expected payoff 
22 For example,  there  is an alternative  storage  technology 
with which the domestic investors can obtain a zero rate of 
return. 
Even with fixed domestic savings, it might be the case 
that the amount invested at home not be inelastic because 
the domestic investors invest abroad. Note, though, that, 
unlike Tornell-Velasco (1992) and Velasco (1996), we fo- 
cus on borrowing  countries. And so, provided that foreign 
investors are willing to lend to the country and (unlike in 
Eaton,  1987)  domestic  investors are  not  discriminated 
against relative to foreign investors, risk-neutral  domestic 
investors have no strict incentive to invest abroad. Risk 
aversion and portfolio diversification,  by contrast,  provide 
incentives to invest abroad:  see Application 2. 
23 It is straightforward  to allow for taxes on foreigners' 
portfolio income. See also the discussion of capital inflow 
taxation  below. 
(p  +  r*)(R  -  r)I. 
Example: The wedge between the full value RI 
and the pledgeable  part  rI, which is a distinctive 
feature  of corporate  finance,  can for example be 
derived from a classic moral hazard problem. 
Suppose  that  the entrepreneur  can obtain  private 
benefit BI, proportional  to investment, by mis- 
behaving (and no such benefit when behaving). 
The probability  of success then falls from (p + 
T*) to  (q  +  r*),  where  q  <  p.  The  incentive 
constraint  then requires  that the entrepreneur's 
stake,  Rb, in success be substantial  enough so as 
to deter misbehavior: 







p-  q 
The fraction  B/[(p -  q)R] measures  the agency 
cost. 
Incidence.-The  section  proceeds  in  two 
steps. First, it  assumes that the  government 
chooses the date-1 policy  so  as to maximize 
domestic welfare. Then, it generalizes the anal- 
ysis  to redistributive  politics by allowing the 
government to put different weights on entre- 
preneurs and  domestic  investors/consumers. 
While incidence does not affect the date-1 pol- 
icy choice under  domestic-welfare  maximization, 
it impacts the date-0 investment;  in particular, 
suppose that the date-1 cost of  the policy  is 
x-y(T)I  for entrepreneurs,  and (1  -  x)y(T)I for 
domestic investors/consumers.24  Entrepreneurs, 
24  The ex post  incidence coincides with the ex  ante 
(date-O)  incidence  under  our assumption  that y is lump-sum. 
If the cost were not lump-sum,  then the ex ante incidence y 
would in general exceed the ex post incidence x; in partic- 
ular,  a tax on capital  decided at date 1 but anticipated  at date 
0 would be passed through  to entrepreneurs  via an increase 
in the interest  rate. 
Note also that  the fraction  xy(r)I borne  by entrepreneurs 
can be viewed either as a nonmonetary  cost imposed on 
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if  they  can  secure funding, invest  if  (p  + 
r*) R  -  1 -  xy(r*) > 0. They do not internalize 
the  general  population's  investment-support 
cost (1 -  x)y(r*)I. We will return  to this point 
in Applications 3 and 4.25 
B.  Government  Maximizes  Domestic Welfare 
max{[(p + T)R  -  1 -  y(T)]/(T)}, 
T 
where  (rT)  satisfies (12). Assuming that invest- 
ment is socially desirable,26  that  is, (p +  r)R - 
1 -  y >  0, the second-best  commitment  policy 
satisfies 
For  a  given  anticipation T  of  the  policy 
choice, the representative  entrepreneur's  invest- 
ment is  limited by  the extent of  pledgeable 
income: 
I-A  =  V =  (p +  T)rI. 
Hence 
A 
[We will  assume that 1  >  (p  +  r)r in  the 
relevant range. That is, an extra unit of invest- 
ment creates less than one unit of pledgeable 
income; otherwise investment  would be infinite 
in this constant-return-to-scale  model.] 
Commitment  Policy.-The  first-best optimal 
policy TFB solves: 
max{(p  +  T)RI -  y(T)I},  or  y'(TFB) =  R. 
T 
However, and as was pointed out in Section I, 
subsection C,  the first-best policy  is  not the 
proper  benchmark  in the presence of credit ra- 
tioning. The  second-best commitment policy 
should aim not only at increasing ex post total 
surplus  but also at ex ante attracting  capital in a 
situation  in which the latter is insufficient.  The 
second-best policy  'sB maximizes date-0 total 
surplus: 
y,(TB)  >  R. 
Time-Consistent  Policy.-Consider  now  an 
equilibrium  policy  r*. That is, at date 0, eco- 
nomic agents correctly  anticipate  that  the policy 
choice at date 1 will be  r*, and so the invest- 
ment level is I(r*). At date 1, the foreign inves- 
tors' stake is, for actual policy choice T, 
(Id + If  (Id +  [(p +  )rI( *)]. 
At date 1, the government chooses T so as to 
maximize domestic welfare V -  Vf: 
max  (p+r)  (R-r)+  Id  +  )r 
-  y(T)  I(r*)', 
and so 
(13)  y'(T*)  =  R -  If  r. 
As expected, firms  are less profitable,  the higher 
the foreigners' stake in the firmnns.  An equilib- 
rium is a pair (7*, If)  satisfying (13) with If = 
If and 
I*+  Id  =  (p  +  T*)rA 
If  Id  -  (p  +  *)r' 
I now derive a few implications  of this analysis. 
entrepreneurs  or as a tax on entrepreneurial  income that 
cannot be pledged to investors. 
25  This point bears some resemblance with the "soft- 
budget constraint"  problem, under which a benevolent so- 
cial planner  may rescue distressed, but viable investments 
and possibly encourage ex ante investments with negative 
social value. 
Application 1: Impact of Domestic Savings. 
-The  policy  inefficiency decreases with the 
share  of domestic savings. As domestic savings 
26 This is necessarily the case if the incidence falls pri- 
marily on entrepreneurs  (x close to 1). 
VOL.  93 NO. 5  1687 THE  AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW 
grow, foreign investment  is crowded  out and so 
r* increases: Domestic savings act as a shield 
for foreign investment. Policies  favoring do- 
mestic savings through  tax incentives, pension 
funds  or  privatization targeted to  investors 
therefore  have a positive impact  on government 
behavior (although they may involve costs of 
their own) and may increase not only total in- 
vestment, but also foreign investment. 
A related idea can be found in Bruno Biais 
and Enrico Perotti's (2002) model of privatiza- 
tion. There, a government  lacking commitment 
power over  its  future policy  allocates suffi- 
ciently many shares  to its constituency  in order 
to commit  not to follow an expropriation  policy. 
The common thread  is that  the government  may 
want to alter the distribution  of financial  assets 
in order  to manipulate  its own incentives. 
Application 2: International  Diversification. 
-A  closely  related point can be  made with 
respect to international  risk sharing. Suppose 
that there is aggregate  risk in the country-that 
is, the realizations  of the domestic firms' profits 
are not independent. Suppose further  that do- 
mestic savers, instead of being risk neutral,  ex- 
hibit at least a tiny bit of risk aversion. Then 
provided  there  is no worldwide  risk, the domes- 
tic investors' optimal portfolio choice is to put 
all their money abroad,  and so 
Id =  0. 
Governmental  moral hazard  is then extreme: 
7'(T*)  =  R-  r. 
This illustration does  not aim at realism-if 
anything  portfolios exhibit a very strong home 
bias, the reasons for which have been exten- 
sively discussed.27  Rather,  it leads us to a more 
general point: Keeping domestic investment at 
home benefits the country (and actually the 
world in our model, since foreign investors al- 
ways break even) as long as the corresponding 
policies do not create a substantial  misalloca- 
tion of investment. Put differently, small fric- 
tions inducing a home bias raise welfare. 
Application  3: Capital Controls.-Let  us re- 
turn  momentarily  to the question posed in Sec- 
tion I regarding the efficient level  of  foreign 
borrowing.  Consider  for instance a unit tax t on 
capital inflows at date 0. The proceeds of this 
tax, tIf =  t(I -  Id -  A), are redistributed  in a 
lump-sum  fashion to domestic residents  (and do 
not affect domestic savings, say). The tax on 
foreign borrowing  raises the return  to domestic 
savings by t. The representative  entrepreneur's 
borrowing  capacity is then given by 
(1  +  t)(I-  A)  =  (p  +  r*)rI, 
since foreigners and domestic savers then ex- 
pect an average  return  equal to 1 + t. Condition 
(13) still holds: 
'y'(T*)  =+ 
r.  (Id  +  If) 
However, foreign investment  decreases  with the 
tax on capital inflows despite a favorable  disci- 
plining  effect on policy choice.28  Domestic wel- 
fare is then 
W =  [(p  +  r*)R  -  1 -  y(r*)]I(T*,  t). 
The impact of the tax on capital inflows can be 
decomposed into two terms: 
dW  dl 
dt  =  [(  +  *)R  -  1 -  y] dt 
d+* 
+ [(R-  y')I]  dt 
The first term on the right-hand side of  this 
equation is  the  counterpart  of  that in  equa- 
tion  (10).  If  the  entrepreneurs  bear the  full 
cost of the policy (x =  1), as in Section I, then 
28 Suppose that I (and If) increases as t increases. Then 
rT*  decreases, and so does 
I= 
A 
(p +  T*)r' 
1 +t 
27 See, e.g., Lewis (1999). 
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(p +  r*)R -  1 -  y is unambiguously  positive 
if there is investment and so the reduction in 
investment  brought  about by the tax has a neg- 
ative welfare impact. This need not be the case 
if  part of  the incidence falls  on  the general 
population (x  <  1). Investments may then be 
sunk,  that  have  a  negative  NPV  ((p  + 
r*)R  <  1  +  /y(T*)).  We  are arguably more 
interested in situations in which investment is 
socially  desirable. The  second  term  is  the 
commitment  effect: The capital control reduces 
foreign investment and disciplines the govern- 
ment, with positive welfare consequences. This 
commitment  effect is negligible if the share of 
foreign investment is small;29  then, the impact 
of a capital control is unambiguously  negative 
provided that investment is socially desirable. 
For large levels of foreign investment, though, 
the commitment effect may dominate the first 
effect and capital controls may then increase 
welfare. 
Application  4:  Debt-Equity  Composition. 
-Last,  but not least,  let us turn  to the foreigners' 
mix  between  loans  and equity  investments. 
The  basic  two-outcome,  no-income-in-case- 
of-failure framework made no distinction be- 
tween  debt  and equity.  A  simple  variation 
allows us to discuss debt and equity in an easy 
way. Suppose now that, for investment level 
I, the firm yields RFI >  0 in case of failure. 
One  can  think  of  RFI  as  the  (pledgeable) 
salvage value of assets, or collateral. Success, 
as earlier, yields an extra income RI, and so 
overall income 
RSI =  (R +  RF)I. 
Firms issue  (safe) debt corresponding to the 
salvage value RFI of  its assets,  and the rest 
represents equity claims. It is easily seen that 
it  is  optimal  for  the  entrepreneurs to  own 
equity  and  no  debt  since  this  arrangement 
maximizes their incentives and they have no 
demand for insurance. Thus the entire debt is 
held by domestic and foreign investors. Let 
[RF  +  (p  +  r*)r]I denote  the  pledgeable 
29  Since y'  -  R if If =  0. 
income.30 The per-unit-of-investment  value of 
debt is therefore rD =  RF, and that of equity 
(p +  r*)rE  =  (p +  r*)r. Foreigners  hold frac- 
tions af and of  of the domestic equity and  debt. 
The break-even  constraints  are: 
If =  [af(p  +  T*)rE  +  afrD]I 
and 
Id =  [(1  -  af)(p  +  r*)rE +  (1  -  af)rD]I. 
Being risk neutral,  both foreigners  and  domestic 
residents are indifferent as to the claim they 
hold. Thus, the overall break-even  constraint, 
I-A  =  [(p  +  r*)rE +  rD]I 
is compatible  with a continuum  of possible for- 
eign equity stakes. 
But, while investors individually  are indiffer- 
ent as to which claim they hold, they collec- 
tively are not. Indeed,  the government  selects its 
policy at date 1 so as to solve: 
max{[(p + r)[(R -  r) + a4r] -  y(T)]I/(r*)}. 
T 
Thus, an increase  in the foreigners'  equity hold- 
ings/value at stake, or equivalently in af,  re- 
duces discipline and country  welfare.31 
Again, I wish to emphasize  the broader  impli- 
cations  of this analysis  rather  than  its details.  The 
investors'  indifference  between  domestic  debt  and 
equity  only offers analytical  convenience  and  can 
be broken  in several  ways. For example,  a favor- 
able capital  adequacy  treatment  encouraging  for- 
eign banks to hold debt or an implicit deposit 
insurance  in domestic  banks  pushes  toward  a low 
of. Similarly,  the resort  to high-powered  monitor- 
ing by domestic  conglomerates  encourages  equity 
30  In the moral hazard  illustration,  again 
B 
r=R- 
p-  q 
31 For the now familiar  reason  the conclusion on country 
welfare hinges on the entrepreneurs'  bearing  enough of the 
cost y. 
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holdings by domestic residents.  Conversely,  in- 
vestor risk aversion would encourage  domestic 
investors  to avoid the domestic stock market  if 
there  are country  shocks. 
The broad  point is that  at the margin  the basic 
externality applies: When a foreigner substi- 
tutes equity for debt, he does not internalize  the 
change  in  the  government's incentives  and 
therefore the domestic entrepreneurs'  increase 
in the cost of funds.  In this sense, the conclusion 
is robust  to a more sophisticated  description  of 
portfolio allocation.32 
The following proposition summarizes our 
analysis: 
PROPOSITION  3: In comparison to the first- 
best government  policy (for which the marginal 
cost of the policy is equal to its marginal ben- 
efit), the equilibrium  policy under a domestic- 
welfare  maximizing  government  is  more 
investor-friendly  under commitment,  and less 
investor-friendly  in the time-consistent  solution. 
Furthermore,  provided that most of the cost of 
the policy  is  borne by the productive sector, 
country  welfare increases when 
(a)  domestic savings increase and/or exhibit a 
stronger home bias, 
(b) a capital control is relaxed, provided that 
foreign ownership is small, 
(c)  marginal incentives are provided to for- 
eigners to hold debt rather than equity. 
C. Redistributive  Politics 
Suppose  next that  the government  weighs do- 
mestic constituencies  unequally.  Namely, entre- 
preneurs  receive weight k and non-entrepreneurs 
weight 1 -  k. For  example,  one would  expect  k to 
be large under "crony capitalism";  in contrast, 
1  -  k should increase with the creation of 
32 A caveat, though:  Government  moral  hazard  may also 
affect the value of debt, in contrast  with our depiction. A 
reduced budget for the enforcement of property  rights in 
bankruptcy  processes reduces the value  rD obtained by 
debtholders  in case of failure.  A more general analysis thus 
trades off the negative impacts of  an increase in foreign 
equity  holdings and  debt  holdings  on the two forms  of moral 
hazard.  The market  allocation  however has no reason to be 
efficient in that respect. 
pension funds, which make the median voter 
more concerned about portfolio returns. For 
simplicity I make no distinction between do- 
mestic savers and the median voter, although 
such a distinction  would be warranted  in many 
applications  (indeed, the point on pension funds 
I just made  implicitly  rests on such a distinction. 
Pension funds imply that  the median  voter has a 
higher portfolio stake). 
I assume that the government  is stable in that 
the weights do not change between dates 0 and 
1. This calls for two comments.  First,  even more 
so than previously, outside judgments on the 
government's  policy are hard to formulate.  As 
we will see, the latter may have very unpalat- 
able features, which raises the usual moral di- 
lemma of whether  the international  community 
ought to adopt  a paternalistic  attitude  vis-a-vis a 
democratically  elected government.33  Second, it 
would be interesting  to study how the strategic 
choice of date-0 public policies affecting bor- 
rowing structure  and level  is  affected by the 
possibility of government  turnover.34 
Under redistributive  politics (k  :  1/2), the 
incidence of the effort, y(r)I, incurred  to boost 
profitability  impacts the date-1 choice. As de- 
scribed  earlier,  I assume that a fraction  x of this 
cost is borne by entrepreneurs  and a fraction 
1 -  x by domestic savers. Let us focus on the 
two polar cases: 
(a)  Crony capitalism (k  -  1)-Under  crony 
capitalism, the  government cares  solely 
about  the welfare of entrepreneurs.  For k = 
1, its date-I choice solves: 




33  Relatedly, Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2001) 
discuss the moral dilemma involved in some bailouts, that 
may allow domestic extortion  while easing the overall pain 
of a crisis. 
34 Along the lines of  the pioneering work of  Torsten 
Persson and Lars Svensson (1989),  Guido Tabellini and 
Alberto Alesina (1990), and Philippe Aghion and Patrick 
Bolton (1991) in closed-economy settings. 
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As expected, if only a small fraction x is 
borne by the entrepreneurs  (one can think 
of severe austerity measures or labor laws 
imposed  on  the  population),  the  high 
emphasis  on  profitability may  result  in 
policies  that are  more  investor-friendly 
than even  the  second-best  policy  under 
domestic-welfare maximization.3 
Turning now to date 0, the government 
internalizes 
[(p  +  T*)(R  -  r) -  Xy(T*)]I(T*). 
Because  the  date-1  policy  is  fixed,  the 
government has  no  instrument to  boost 
investment,  which  is  its  date-0  goal.  It 
contents itself  with laissez-faire,3  yield- 
ing, for salvage value RF per unit of in- 
vestment, investment I(T*) given by: 
I(T*)  -A  =  [RF +  (p  +  T*)r]I(T*). 
Suppose  next  that  k  is  close  to,  but 
smaller than 1. The date-I policy  choice 
then solves: 
max  k[(p  +  )(R  -  r)  - x  (T)] 
T 
+ (l-k)  (p+  )(  Id+ 
(1 
-  x)(T)  }. 
At  date  0,  the  government  optimally 
forces domestic investors to (a) invest at 
home,  and  (b)  invest  in  stocks.  This 
date-0  policy  raises  T* and  allows  the 
government's  entrepreneurial friends  to 
borrow more. 
(b) Median voter politics (k  = 0)-Let  us in 
contrast  assume that  entrepreneurs  carry  lit- 
35  This provides a formulation  of the classical argument 
according to which implicit guarantees  represent  a policy 
distortion.  Indeed,  bailouts  by domestic taxpayers  are math- 
ematically very similar to a high level of T in a context in 
which x is small. 
36  The government  would like to subsidize date-0 invest- 
ment, but I have not allowed this instrument. 
tle  weight in  the government's objective 
function. When k  =  0,  the government's 
date-1 policy solves: 
max{ (p +  )  d  r-  (1  -  x)y  , 
T  Id + 
yielding 
Id( 
Id +  If/  '  (*)=  -  r. 
The policy choice is not investor-friendly 
if  the burden falls  mainly on  savers (x 
small). 
Full  capital-account  liberalization  is 
never optimal under median-voter politics 
if  x  <  1.  Domestic  savers  never  gain 
anything on  their savings,  that compete 
against a perfectly elastic  supply of for- 
eign  funds  [(p  +  T*)(Idl(Id  +  If))rI  = 
Id],  and they  bear the cost  (1  -  x)/yI.  As 
losers, domestic savers are better off with 
strict capital controls, and, if  their gov- 
ernment is unable to impose capital con- 
trols, with date-0 policies  that encourage 
a high foreign equity stake in the country 
and a capital flight of  domestic savings, 
so as to ex post minimize r. 
However, the government  can at date 0 
transform  domestic savers into winners by 
capturing the entrepreneurs'  rent through 
capital  controls  and  taxes on capital  inflows. 
Capital controls (forcing If down) provide 
domestic savers with a supranormal  rate of 
return.  Furthermore,  if Id is small, domestic 
savers do benefit from some capital inflows 
as long as these can be taxed with proceeds 
redistributed to  domestic  savers.  Either 
way,  domestic  savers'  conversion  into 
winners may  alter their  attitude toward 
investor-friendly  policies. 
PROPOSITION  4:  (a) The government's  pol- 
icy may be more investor-friendly  under crony 
capitalism than in  the second best. Further- 
more, crony capitalism leads to a  (policy in- 
duced) home bias and to a  (policy  induced) 
composition  tilted  toward  debt-holding  by 
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0  1  2 
*  Repiesentative 
entiepreneur has 
wealth A, 
borrows I-  A, 
invests I. 
*  Financial 
contract: dI to 
be reimbursed at 
date 1, and, if 
firm continues at 
date 1 and 
succeeds at date 






I  I 
*  Income sI  accrues; 
debt dI due. 
*  Liquidity shock: pI. 
*  Market observes 
choice of r. 
*  Firm continues iff 
liquidity shock met. 
*  (If  continues  at 
date 1): profit RI 
(prob p + r) 
or 0 
(prob 1-(p+r)). 
*  Sharing of  profit 
according to 
date-0 contract. 
FIGURE  1.  TIMING 
foreigners. And while these biases are benefi- 
cial when the government  maximizes  domestic 
welfare, they result in an excessive concern  for 
profitability  when austerity measures aimed at 
benefiting the  government's entrepreneurial 
friends are mainly borne by the population at 
large. 
(b) Median-voter politics  lead to  investor- 
unfriendly  policies, and to resistance to capital- 
account liberalization. 
III. Maturity  of Liabilities 
A.  Framework 
I now analyze the possibility of a short-term 
bias in foreign borrowing.  To do so, I need to 
employ a  multistage financing framework in 
which firms optimally trade off the costs and 
benefits of short-term  liabilities. Let us enrich 
the framework  of Section II, subsection A, by 
adding an intermediate  income and an interme- 
diate liquidity shock. The intermediate  income 
enables  firms  to reimburse  some short-term  debt 
while  the  intermediate shock  introduces  a 
liquidity-shortage  cost of such debt. The timing 
is summarized  in Figure 1. 
The only new feature is the management  of 
date-1 liquidity.  The firm  receives deterministic 
income sl, out of which short-term  debt dl -  sI 
is repaid.  Furthermore,  the firm  faces a liquidity 
shock: It must then spend an overrun  expendi- 
ture equal to pI in order  to continue. It is liqui- 
dated and no surplus accrues to any party if it 
does not spend this money. The liquidity shock 
p is distributed  (independently  across firms) ac- 
cording to  cumulative distribution F(p)  with 
density f(p) on [0, oo). This distribution  has a 
monotone hazard  rate: 
f(p) 
F(p) is decreasing. 
The monotone  hazard  rate condition is satisfied 
by almost all familiar distributions37  and will 
guarantee the concavity of  the government's 
objective function. 
If the firm continues, it delivers as earlier at 
date 2 and with probability  p  +  r, profit  RI, of 
which rI is pledgeable to investors. 
37 E.g., uniform,  normal,  logistic, chi-squared,  exponen- 
tial, and Laplace. 
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I assume that the country  bears cost y(T)I  per 
continuing  finn and that  this cost (or the fraction 
borne  by entrepteneurs)  is viewed as a lump-sum 
cost by the entrepreneurs  (none of these assump- 
tions  is important).  I also abstract  from  the  issue of 
domestic- versus foreign-borrowing  composition 
by assuming  away  domestic  savings  (Id = 0). This 
simplification  implies  that  in the  absence  of liquid- 
ity shocks, a domestic-welfare  maximizing  gov- 
ernment would choose r =  ',  where 
T'(f) =  R-  r. 
Substituting  I into U yields: 
U =  Pi  C()  A, 




1 -  s  +  pf(p)dp 
c() 
ce  p) -  -  F(  A) 
Let us first solve for the representative  firm's 
optimal liquidity management.38  Introduce  the 
following notation: 
pI-=(p  +  r*)R  and  po0-(p  +T*)r. 
In words, Pi  and Po are the expected date-2 
value and pledgeable income per unit of invest- 
ment when the policy is expected to be r* (the 
equilibrium  policy). 
Optimal liquidity  management commands 
that the firm withstands the liquidity shock if 
and only if p -  p for some threshold p to be 
determined. The representative  entrepreneur's 
utility is equal to the NPV (ignoring the lump- 
sum cost of the policy): 
(14)  U =  [s + F()pl] 
p 
-  1 +  pf(p)dp  I, 
where  the investment  I is given by the investors' 
break-even  constraint: 
(15)  [s + F(p)po]I =  (I -  A) 
+  pf(p)dp I. 
;o  / 
38 The analysis here follows that of Bengt Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1998). 
is  the average cost of bringing investment to 
completion [a unit of investment  costs on aver- 
age 1 +  fg  pftp)dp, yields s at date 1, and is 
maintained  until date 2 with probability  F(p)]. 
Simple computations  yield the optimal thresh- 
old p =  p*: 
MP* 
F(p) dp =  1-s  and  c(p*) = p*. 
0  o 
It must be the case that p* >  Po (if for some 
value  of  p,  c(p)  -  po, then the  firm could 
borrow  an infinite amount)  and p* <  pi (other- 
wise, no investment would be made). 
This optimal liquidity management  is imple- 
mented by  issuing short-term debt level  d*I 
satisfying:39 
(16)  p* = s -  d*  +  (p +  r*)r 
=  s-  d* +  po. 
To understand  (16), note that the firm can at 
date 1 raise up to (p  +  r*)r by issuing new 
securities, thereby diluting incumbent claim- 
holders;40  for, capital markets  will never bring 
more money at date 1 than what they will get 
back on average at date 2. The nondistributed 
39  This  assumes that the  short-term income  is  large 
enough: s >  p* -  po. Otherwise,  the firms would need to 
hoard liquidity as described in Holmstr6m-Tirole  (1998). 
Similar insights could then be obtained  with respect to this 
hoarded  liquidity.  40  These claimholders  would be willing to be diluted in 
order to raise cash to meet the liquidity shock, since they 
receive nothing if the firm is liquidated. 
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liquidity  s -  d* is needed to cover the shortfall 
between p* and po.41  Note also that an increase 
in its short-term  debt makes the firm  more likely 
to  default. The  firm optimally arbitrates  be- 
tween scale (which calls  for high short-term 
debt) and inefficiency from default (an effect 
that calls for low short-term  debt). 
Let us now turn to the government's choice 
of date-1  policy. An out-of-equilibrium  choice T 
implies that firms that continue are those firms 
with shocks satisfying42 
p - s-  d*+  (p +  T)r,  or 
p <  p* +  (r-  r*)r. 
The fraction of  firms that are not liquidated, 
F(p*  +  (T -  r*)r), increases  with r. An investor- 
friendly policy encourages foreign investors to 
refinance  frail firms. 
The government  maximizes ex post domestic 
welfare: 
max{F(p* +  (r-  r*)r)[(p +  r)(R -  r) -  y(T)]}. 
T 
The monotone hazard rate assumption  implies 
that  this objective  function  is concave. The first- 
order  condition is: 
(17)  y'(r*)  =  R-r 
+  [(p  +  r*)(R  -  r)  -  y(T*)]r  F(p*) 
Compared with  a  situation without liquidity 
shocks, the government  adopts  a more investor- 
friendly policy so as to reduce liquidation. 
Equation (17),  together with the monotone 
hazard  rate property,  yields the main insight of 
this section. Consider a small increase in the 
41 Note that it is  crucial for this section to employ a 
corporate  finance rather  than an Arrow-Debreu  model. In 
the absence of agency cost, the firm  would not face liquidity 
problems and so leverage would be irrelevant. 
42  This assertion  is true only locally. If T differs from r* 
so much that the right-hand  side of this inequality  exceeds 
pi or falls below po, the contract  between financiers  and the 
entrepreneur  is renegotiated.  But we are here interested  in 
deriving the first-order  condition. 
short-term  debt from the privately  optimal  value 
d*. This amounts to an equal reduction in the 
threshold p*  for a  given government policy. 
From (17), and using the monotone-hazard-rate 
property, the  government partly offsets  the 
shortage  in liquidity through  an increase in T: 
d(rr) 
0<  d(d*)  <1. 
In words, domestic firms do not internalize  the 
disciplining effect of an increase in the level of 
their short-term  debt level on the government's 
policy.  Short-term debt  fragilizes  firms and 
forces the government  to help them secure re- 
financing.  This increased  discipline in turn  gen- 
erates two welfare benefits that are ultimately 
reaped by domestic entrepreneurs.  First, it im- 
proves the date-1 policy choice r*, and there- 
fore financing conditions for a given level of 
investment. Second, it increases borrowing  ca- 
pacity, which is valuable given the presence of 
credit rationing. 
B.  Contingent  Debt 
Issuing noncontingent  short-term  debt is pri- 
vately optimal in the deterministic  equilibrium 
of Section III, subsection A. Thus the previous 
analysis  is indeed an equilibrium  analysis.  More 
generally,  though,  optimal  short-term debt 
ought to be state-contingent  so as to react to 
macroeconomic news  accruing at date  1  (in 
practice  this flexibility is provided  for example 
by indexed debt or by preferred  equity). 
This sensitivity  to macroeconomic  conditions 
in  turn impacts the government's incentives. 
The Appendix checks that the insights obtained 
in  Section III, subsection A,  still hold when 
firms  more  generally  issue  state-contingent 
short-term debt. The  only  difference is  that 
state-contingent debt  generates more  policy 
discipline. 
More precisely, when T is random,  the opti- 
mal refinancing  decision is shown to be sensi- 
tive to prospects: 
p*(T)  =  (p  +  r)r, 
where 
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R +  tur  = 
+  E(r,  R) 
(and ,x is  the shadow price of  the financing 
constraint).  Because r >  r and  the firm  can raise 
only up to (p  +  T)r  by issuing new securities, 
the optimal short-term debt d*(T) is  linearly 
decreasing  in r. Intuitively,  improved  prospects 
for date 2 boost not only the pledgeable income 
(as reflected  by an increased  access to refinanc- 
ing), but also the nonpledgeable  income, vindi- 
cating lower short-term  obligations. 
The randomness  of r can be endogenized for 
example by  letting the marginal cost  of  the 
investor-friendly  policy depend on the realiza- 
tion of a state of nature  s with continuous dis- 
tribution  with a large support: 
7(T)  +  8T. 
When the distribution  of 8 is close to a spike at 
date 043  (to make the analysis comparable to 
that of  Section  III, subsection A),  then the 
date-1 government  policy can be shown to con- 
verge to that given by 
(18)  7'(T*)=  R -r 
F(p*) 
+  [(p+  T*)(R  -r)-  (r*)]rF  * 
The only difference between (17) and (18) is 
that an investor-friendly  policy  rescues more 
firms when debt is state-contingent  (r >  r). The 
insights of Section III, subsection  A, carry  over 
to contingent debt. 
PROPOSITION  5: Suppose that the firms op- 
timally trade off the cost and benefit of short- 
term debt, namely the increased probability of 
being illiquid and the enhanced borrowing ca- 
pacity. A fixed level of short-term debt d* is 
optimal when the private sector  has perfect 
foresight about the government  policy. By con- 
trast, an (optimal) state-contingent  government 
policy calls for a contingent  debt contract  d* = 
a -  bT,  that takes advantages of new informa- 
43  Keeping the support  of the distribution  constant. 
tion about the  firm's prospects. State-contingent 
debt  makes  the  government policy  more 
investor-friendly. 
In either case, a small increase in the short- 
term  debt  from the  privately  optimal  level raises 
country  welfare. 
IV. Liability  Dollarization 
A.  Framework 
To illustrate  the impact of the choice of lia- 
bility  denomination in  the  simplest possible 
manner,  let us ignore credit rationing. 
The model is a real exchange rate one. There 
are two goods, a tradable  good, valued by both 
domestic residents and foreigners, and a non- 
tradable  good,  valued  only  by  domestic 
residents. 
As earlier,  there  are three  periods,  t = 0, 1, 2. 
Date 0  is  the financing stage and date 2  the 
return  period. Date 1 is the intermediate  date at 
which the government  chooses its policy. For- 
eigners' preferences  value the date-0 and date-2 
tradable  goods equally (and so the world rate of 
interest is zero): 
W* =  c*  +  c* 
where a "star"  indicates  a tradable  good and "no 
star" a  nontradable one.  Domestic  residents 
have utility from consumptions c2 of nontrad- 
ables, c* of tradables, and g*  of public good 
(see below) equal to: 
W=  c2  +  u2(c*)  +  v(g*) 
where u2 and v are strictly concave. (We could 
add date-0 consumption.  This would not affect 
the results.) 
We  will  let  e2 denote the date-2 price of 
tradables  in terms on nontradables  (note: a de- 
preciation  corresponds  to an increase  in e2). The 
date-2 consumption  function is given by 
u2(c*(e2))  =  e2 
The  domestic  consumption of  tradables de- 
creases as the exchange rate depreciates. 
The representative  domestic resident is  an 
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entrepreneur  who transforms  a tradable  input  I* 
into a deterministic  nontradable  output  y(I/) at 
date 2. The date-0 input I/f is borrowed from 
foreigners, as the entrepreneur  is not endowed 
with tradables.  The production  function  y(/I) is 
strictly  concave  and  satisfies  the  Inada 
conditions. 
The entrepreneur  commits to reimbursing  d2 
in tradable  goods and d2 in nontradables.  The 
amount  d2 will be paid directly from y(If), and 
foreign investors will then need to convert it 
into tradables.  In contrast, to reimburse d*, it 
will be incumbent  on the entrepreneur  to con- 
vert nontradable  production at the going ex- 
change rate. 
While the theory below is purely one of the 
real exchange rate, I will, by a substantial  leap 
of faith, interpret  the denomination  of debt in 
the tradable good as one in foreign currency 
(dollars). Note,  though, that a  similar story 
could be told in a monetary model, in which 
"depreciation"  would be replaced by "nominal 
devaluation."44 
Last, I formalize the common concern that 
recipients  of large capital  inflows may use them 
to finance large fiscal deficits or consumption 
booms by assuming  that  the government  selects 
at date 1 a level of public good g* E [0, R*] (so 
the discretionary  action a is here g*). The key 
assumption  is that a higher  level of public good 
44  The type of moral hazard  formalized in this section, 
though, need not be viewed as the government's action of 
expanding  the monetary  base to deflate  the nominal  value of 
foreigners' domestic currency  claims through  inflation. As 
for example Eichengreen-Hausmann  (1999)  and Marcos 
Chamon  (2001) note, many  emerging  markets  have inflation 
indexed instruments;  furthermore  foreign currency  borrow- 
ing applies even to countries  with no recent history of high 
inflation. And so the problem is much deeper than that of 
surprise  inflation. 
Chamon (2001) develops a model of foreign currency 
denomination  in the absence of government  moral hazard, 
but in the presence of aggregate productivity  shocks. Do- 
mestic entrepreneurs  invest and  produce  tradables,  and  issue 
debt liabilities labeled in tradables  or nontradables.  Entre- 
preneurial  risk aversion implies that debt denominated  in 
nontradables  offers a hedge against  macroeconomic  shocks; 
however, if the share of output that can be collected by 
foreigners in bad states of nature  is assumed to grow with 
total face value (expressed  in tradables),  then denomination 
in tradables  facilitates private  borrowing.  See Aghion et al. 
(2001) for a model of foreign currency borrowing in the 
presence of nominal rigidities. 
comes at the expense of "country  reserves."  The 
total amount of  uncommitted domestic (pri- 
vately and publicly owned) tradables  available 
for trade at date 2 is R* -  g*. While one can 
think of R* as the government's  initial endow- 
ment of foreign reserves, R* should be given a 
much broader interpretation;  for example, an 
increase in g* may come at the expense of new 
activities  and  production in  another, export 
sector. 
B. Analysis 
Let us begin with a derivation of the time- 
inconsistent policy. The first-best  policy maxi- 
mizes  the  utility  of  the  representative 
entrepreneur: 
max {y(If  +  u2(R* -  g*  -  1  +  v(g*)}, 
{g*, *} 
where use is made of the fact that the entrepre- 
neur will  have to reimburse, one way or the 
other, the borrowed amount in tradables.  This 
yields: 
=  2=  V  =  e2. 
Let us now turn to the time-consistent policy. 
Fixing (d*, d2), the date-2 exchange rate clears 
the market  for tradable  goods: 
(19)  c*(e2)  +  +  = R* -  g*. 
The exchange rate e2(g*) is an increasing  func- 
tion of g*. Note also that:  (2(g  ))  1,  dg* 
with strict inequality unless d2 =  0. 
In words, it is only when foreign debt is denom- 
inated in tradables,  that is when the foreigner's 
stake Vf =  d* +  (d2/e2) is  insensitive to the 
exchange rate, that an increase in the public 
good  is  offset one-for-one by  a reduction in 
consumption. 
At date 1, the government  selects g* so as to 
solve: 
max {u2(c*(e2(g*)))  + v(g*)}, 
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which yields: 
(20)  '=dc  u2  dg* 
The time-inconsistent policy coincides with 
the time-consistent one if and only if foreign 
debt is fully denominated  in tradables: 
d2  =  0. 
The government  overconsumes  international  re- 
serves when part  of the debt is labelled in non- 
tradables. Forcing  firms  to  engage  in  risk 
management  reduces country welfare. 
In this model, firms are individually  indiffer- 
ent as to the "currency"  denomination  of their 
liabilities. Of course, they would not be indif- 
ferent in richer  models. For example, one could 
combine this analysis and that of Section III to 
look at optimal risk management when firms 
face liquidity shocks at the intermediate  date.45 
The general  point, though, is that at the mar- 
gin the firms  do not label enough their  liabilities 
in tradables,  as they do not internalize  the dis- 
ciplining effect of the denomination  on govern- 
ment policy. 
Remark: The  assumption that the  foreigners 
have no value at risk under foreign currency 
denomination  is of course extreme. In practice, 
they have value at risk not only because gov- 
ernments  may renege and directly expropriate  a 
fraction of foreign holdings (a strategy not al- 
45 The prospect of a government  bailout may also affect 
this choice. In Martin  Schneider  and  Tornell  (2001), domes- 
tic firms (or banks) optimally  denominate  their  foreign debt 
in tradable  goods. That paper assumes that the government 
undertakes "systemic bailouts," i.e.,  bailouts are granted 
only if a critical mass of firms default. Tradable-good  debt 
denomination  is a gamble that increases the probability  of 
receiving the bailout subsidy; in  effect,  it  increases the 
probability that the firm goes bankrupt  when other firms 
also do (i.e., when the price of nontradables  over tradables 
is low), and so the government  grants a bailout. A bailout 
policy on the other hand helps the credit-constrained  do- 
mestic firms to borrow more. 
More generally, "original  sin features"  that are induced 
by the prospect  of domestic bank  bailout  or by Basle criteria 
on the lending-banks  side are probably  better addressed  by 
a  proper prudential regulation of  domestic and foreign 
banks than by a broader  prohibition  of the features. 
lowed  here), but also  because some  of  this 
foreign  currency denomination is  fictitious. 
Typically, individual  firms'  profit  is random  and 
the collateral received by foreigners in case of 
failure  may be nontradable,  as in the case of real 
estate. 
PROPOSITION  6: In the liability-denomination 
model, encouraging  at the margin domestic en- 
trepreneurs  to hedge their  currency  risk  reduces 
country  welfare. 
C. Redistributive  Politics 
Let us conclude  with a few thoughts  about  the 
redistributive  politics of exchange rate policies. 
Relaxing  the assumption  that  domestic  residents 
are a single (entrepreneur/consumer)  constitu- 
ency,  note that consumers and entrepreneurs 
may be hurt  differently  by a depreciation.  Sup- 
pose  that the government puts weights k on 
entrepreneurs  and 1 -  k on consumers.  Assum- 
ing that the leftover reserves R* -  g* are dis- 
tributed  fairly in the population,  and letting K 
2(1 -  k), the government  solves at date 1: 
max {K[y -  (d2 +  d*e2)] +  e2[R* -  g*] 
g* 
+ [u(c)  -  e2c2] +  v(g*)}, 
where e2 is  still  given  by  (19).  This yields 
first-order  condition: 
dc*  de2 
(21)  v' =  u2  d  -  +  (K-  1)d* d*. 
Comparing (20)  and (21),  the incentive to 
consume reserves is now affected in two ways. 
First, and as in the absence of  redistributive 
politics, if d2 >  0, the reduced availability of 
tradables  hurts foreigners as well as residents. 
This international  burden sharing leads to an 
excessive depreciation  from a date-0 viewpoint. 
The second effect is specific to redistributive 
politics (K  :  1). Public good provision depre- 
ciates the currency (de2/dg* >  0), raising the 
debt burden on entrepreneurs  if d* >  0. This 
effect induces the government  to keep the cur- 
rency appreciated  if it favors entrepreneurs  over 
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consumers  (K >  1) and to depreciate  it further 
if the government  favors consumers (K <  1). 
The analysis provides theoretical ammuni- 
tions  in  support of  Eichengreen and  Haus- 
mann's (1999) suggestion as to why original  sin 
applies to all non-OECD  countries while some 
developed countries  are able to borrow in their 
own  currencies. They propose that the latter 
countries "developed their domestic markets 
first, creating a political constituency that op- 
posed opportunistic  depreciation." 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
An analysis of countries' lack of  access to 
attractive levels  and forms of  financing must 
build on a description of why capital markets 
fail. This paper focuses on uncoordinated  pri- 
vate sector borrowing. Borrowers and lenders 
have no individual incentive to internalize  the 
impact of  their private financing arrangement 
on country  incentives;  the resulting  inefficiency 
is borne by the country  itself. Three  broad  con- 
clusions emerge: 
(1) No strong case can be made on a priori 
grounds that countries over- or underborrow. 
Forces conducive to overinvestment  include (a) 
a reduction in  the quality of  policy  brought 
about  by an increase  in foreign ownership  in the 
country,  as well as two forces that are unrelated 
to international  borrowing:  (b) the incidence on 
domestic third parties of  public policies sup- 
porting private sector borrowers,  an incidence 
that (c) is exacerbated  under crony capitalism. 
In contrast, (d) capital controls impose a sub- 
stantial  cost to the extent that firms are subject 
to credit  rationing  and therefore  are deprived  by 
controls of access to highly productive  capital, 
and (e) median voter politics result in an insuf- 
ficient internalization  of the country's benefits 
from capital accounts liberalization. 
(2) As to the form of liabilities, "dangerous 
forms of debt" cannot be presumed  to be sub- 
optimal for those who issue them. The analysis 
of  the externalities involved in the choice of 
financial  structure  points at the flip side of risk 
exposure: dangerous forms of  debt are also 
"policy resistant";  they make the government 
more accountable, ultimately to the benefit of 
the country.  Encouraging  foreign direct  and eq- 
uity portfolio investment and promoting  inter- 
national  diversification  do  not  encourage 
accountability.  Some match  between stakehold- 
ers  and  political  constituencies  must  be 
achieved. Debt  financing and small frictions 
inducing a home bias therefore should not be 
the  object  of  widespread opprobrium, even 
though they will be encouraged  by politicians 
eager to favor their corporate  friends and then 
may have perverse  consequences. 
The critique concerning short maturities  can 
be analyzed  in a multistage  framework  in which 
firms optimally trade off  the  cost  (liquidity 
shortage)  and  benefit  (better  access to capital)  of 
short-term  liabilities. Short-term  liabilities un- 
ambiguously  improve  policy-making  by  a 
domestic-welfare  maximizing government;  this 
"public good"  is  not  internalized by  firms, 
whose maturity  structure  is therefore  tilted to- 
ward long-term borrowing. While further ef- 
fects must be accounted for (see below), this 
shows  that  strong  views  concerning short- 
terminism  in  capital  flows  may  not  be 
warranted. 
The third  member  of the vulnerability  trilogy, 
foreign currency  denominated  liabilities, is sub- 
ject to a similar conclusion. Again, at the mar- 
gin,  borrowers  do  not  internalize  the 
disciplining impact of such borrowing. 
(3) One cannot assess a country's ability to 
borrow and terms of  borrowing without ac- 
counting for internal politics. The conclusions 
are  reinforced  or  weakened  depending  on 
whether  the interests  of foreigners  are aligned  or 
dissonant with those of dominant  domestic in- 
terest groups. 
Overall, a country's level and quality of ac- 
cess to international  capital  depends  not only on 
its level of international  collateral,46  but also on 
a variety of  institutional features such as the 
level of domestic savings, their location (home 
versus abroad),  the extent of control rights held 
by  political  authorities, and the  interests of 
dominant  domestic political forces. These insti- 
tutional  features  probably  are part  of the reason 
why the United States, in which the government 
has limited control  rights and key political con- 
46  An  aspect investigated thoroughly in  the  work of 
Ricardo  Caballero  and  Arvind  Krishnamurthy (1999, 
2001a, b, c). 
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stituencies' interests  are aligned with investors' 
interests (e.g.,  through the pension fund sys- 
tem), can borrow  so much; and why many poor 
African countries, which have a  much more 
pressing need  for  foreign capital but whose 
wealth is often appropriated  by a small group 
and invested abroad, and whose leaders have 
substantial  control over economic life, have al- 
most no access to the international  capital mar- 
ket.  A  systematic analysis transcending this 
anecdotal  evidence and connecting institutional 
features and foreign borrowing would be very 
useful. 
The paper focused on a common-agency  ex- 
ternality  through  the impact of firms' financial 
structure  on government  behavior. One should 
not restrict analysis to this externality among 
borrowers. For example, firms may take so- 
cially insufficient  precautions  against  distress if 
the social cost of unemployment  is convex in 
the rate of  unemployment or if  a  soft  asset 
market  leads to fire sales in downturns.  Further- 
more, I have not allowed for potential  external- 
ities, such as financial contagion externalities, 
among countries.  Such externalities  may lead to 
a qualification of  some policy implications of 
the common-agency  perspective;47  as discussed 
in the introduction,  the broader  point made in 
this paper will  then be  the complementarity 
between "corporate  finance reform"  and "gov- 
ernment  governance  reform." 
Last, let  me  broaden the perspective. The 
paper  took sovereign rights as given and looked 
at policies altering private sector behavior. A 
complementary  approach,  more in the tradition 
of  the  trade and central banking literatures, 
would focus  on  the devolution of  sovereign 
rights.48 Clearly, many of  the control rights 
47 Another objection to foreign currency denominated 
debt is that, in a pegged exchange rate regime, it makes it 
hard  for countries  to resort  to devaluation  in order  to address 
a balance-of-payments  crisis. For example, Anne Krueger 
(2000)  advocates delinking financial and balance-of-pay- 
ments crises by making foreign currency obligations in- 
curred by domestic entities unenforceable in court or by 
having developed countries  force their financial  institutions 
to accept liabilities abroad  only in local currencies. 
48  The devolution can take many forms, such as joining 
a multilateral  organization,  entering a monetary  union or a 
free-trade agreement, and devolving authority for bank- 
ruptcy and corporate  governance  to independent  courts. 
listed in the introduction  cannot be transferred 
to foreign investors, who, in contrast  with gov- 
ernments, are  excessively  preoccupied with 
profitability and would impose large welfare 
costs on the population.  As suggested in Tirole 
(2002), corporate  finance sheds some light on 
the tradeoffs  in the allocation of control rights; 
but this allocation is a complex issue, that de- 
serves a thorough  treatment  of its own. 
APPENDIX:  CONTINGENT  DEBT 
Noncontingent  debt contracts  were optimal  in 
the  context  of  Section  III.  More  generally, 
though,  contingent  debt is an optimal  reaction  to 
a random  environment.  In particular,  the thresh- 
old p* of Section III, subsection  A, ought to be 
contingent  on the realization  of policy T; this in 
turn affects the choice of  government policy. 
Let us check that the analysis of  Section III, 
subsection A, is robust to contingent debt. To 
this purpose  let us derive the optimal liquidity- 
management policy  p*(T) when  T  is  random. 
Letting  ET denote expectations  with respect  to r, 
the generalizations  of equations (14) and (15) 
are: 
(Al)  U =  [s  +  ET[F(  (T))pl(T)]] 
p(T) 
-  1 + ET  pJfp)dp  I 
o 
and 
(A2)  [s  +  ET[F(p(T))po(r)]]  =  (I -  A) 
A  rp(T) 
+  ET  pf(p)dp  I, 
-'0 
where pl(T)  (p  +  T)R and po(T) =  (p  +  T)r. 
Proceeding  through  the same steps as in Sec- 
tion  Ill, subsection  A, the optimal  state-contingent 
threshold  satisfies: 
Pli(T) w+ ,po(T) 
P*(Tr) 
= 
1 +  p  with  Jx  > 1, 
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or 
-R +  ,Lr- 
p*(T)  =  (p  +  r)  +  -a  +  Tr 
1 +  - 
where r -  [R +  pir]/[l +  ,/] and a  -=  pr. 
Consequently,  the sensitivity of the refinanc- 
ing decision to prospects is  higher than with 
noncontingent  debt: 
dp*/dr =  r >  r. 
The optimal state-contingent  debt is 
/R-  r 
d*(T)  =  -  (p  +  )  1  + 
It decreases with the expected nonpledgeable 
income (p  +  r)(R -  r). [The increase in the 
value of the pledgeable income brought about 
by an increase in T is addressed  through  date-I 
market  refinancing].  We can perform  the same 
analysis  as in Section III, subsection  A, but with 
contingent debt. To introduce some noise and 
thereby  justify contingent  debt, suppose  that  the 
analyzed cost of the policy is 
y(r)  +  er; 
the case treated  in Section III, subsection A, is 
therefore  the case in which the random  variable 
s (realized at date 1) converges to a spike at 0. 
At date 1 the government,  knowing the realiza- 
tion of e, solves: 
max {F(p*(T))[(p  +  r)(R -  r) -  [y(r)  +  se]]}, 
T 
and so, 
y'(T(e))  =  R -  r +  [(p  +  r(e))(R  -  r) 
-  [7r(e))  +  e(?)]]^  F(p*(-(e)))  -. 
For e small, the only difference  with (17) is that 
"r" is  replaced by  "r." State-contingent  debt 
creates more discipline. Last, one can perform 
the same exercise as in Section III, subsection 
A: a small uniform increase in the debt level 
(i.e., a decrease in a) increases r for each e. 
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